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UNIONS AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
LITIGATION
Charlotte Garden*
I. INTRODUCTION
Labor unions and federations, particularly the American Federation of
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), devote significant
resources to litigating before the Supreme Court. This Supreme Court litigation
frequently takes place in cases that reach far beyond labor law, meaning that
unions help to shape the law governing many aspects of American society.
Virtually no legal scholarship considers the role that unions play in these
cases,1 and consequently there has been no systemic attention to the positions
that unions take before the Supreme Court. Yet, unions’ litigation positions,
especially before the Supreme Court, yield useful information about union
strategies and priorities.
The labor movement frequently participates in litigation regarding the
constitutionality of campaign finance law. Unions’ litigation in this area is par-
ticularly important because the structure of campaign finance law plays a role
in determining who is elected to office; in other words, legal developments in
this area have far-reaching effects on substantive law and policy. This Essay
lays the groundwork for future analysis of the important relationship between
unions and campaign finance litigation. To that end, it describes how the labor
movement has sought to shape campaign finance law through litigation, analyz-
ing the contours of union positions in Supreme Court campaign finance cases
as well as the outcomes of those cases. It also briefly discusses how the labor
movement has adapted to modern campaign finance law, particularly after Citi-
zens United v. FEC.2
II. UNION LITIGATION IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE CASES
Two important and related issues bear on the permissible scope of unions’
political advocacy. First, there is the extent to which unions may require or
encourage the employees they represent to pay dues or fees that the union then
uses for political advocacy. In other work, I have analyzed and critiqued the
* Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law. This Essay was written in
connection with the Democracy and the Workplace symposium hosted at UNLV Boyd
School of Law in February 2012. I am grateful for the helpful feedback on this topic that I
received at that symposium. I would also like to thank the editors of the Nevada Law Journal
for their careful work on this Essay.
1 I discuss unions’ litigation before the Supreme Court in other types of non-labor law cases
in Union Made: Labor’s Litigation for Social Change. Charlotte Garden, Union Made:
Labor’s Litigation for Social Change, 88 TUL. L. REV. 193 (2013).
2 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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caselaw governing this subject.3 Second, there are campaign finance laws that
govern political contributions and expenditures by individuals and groups,
including labor unions. These laws are the focus of this Essay.
Unions’ participation in cases concerning the constitutionality of Ameri-
can campaign finance laws has been sporadic. First, two early campaign
finance cases involved union defendants. Second, the AFL-CIO has partici-
pated as a party or amicus in nearly all of the campaign finance cases that the
Court has heard over the last decade. Conversely, unions generally refrained
from participating at all (even as amicus) in many of the key cases that came
between these two periods. This recent resurgence appears to reflect a concern
on the part of the AFL-CIO with ensuring that it is permitted to communicate
about political issues with officeholders and the American public, an issue that
has been presented in several recent cases.
A. Early Cases
The first campaign finance statute, the Tillman Act of 1907, did not apply
to unions—rather, it covered only national banks and those corporations that
were “organized by authority of any laws of Congress.”4 Nor were unions
included when Congress closed certain loopholes in the Tillman Act by enact-
ing the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925.5 Labor unions’ political spend-
ing was not comprehensively regulated6 until 1943, when the War Labor
Disputes Act added unions to the list of entities regulated by the Federal Cor-
rupt Practices Act, banning them from making any contribution “in connection
with” most federal elections for the duration of World War II.7 However, this
limitation did not eliminate union participation in electoral politics altogether:
shortly after the War Labor Disputes Act, the CIO created the first political
action committee (PAC) in order to support labor legislation and democratic
candidates, including the re-election of Franklin Roosevelt.8 “Through the CIO
PAC and general education expenditures, unions spent more money in the 1944
3 Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech
Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 32–39 (2011).
4 Act of Jan. 26, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864.
5 Federal Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 68-506, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925).
6 In 1940, Congress made it unlawful “for any person, directly or indirectly, to make contri-
butions in an aggregate amount in excess of $5,000 . . . in connection with any [federal]
campaign.” 1940 Amendments to the Hatch Act, Pub. L. No. 76-753, § 13, 54 Stat. 767, 770.
The statute further defined person to include “an individual, partnership, committee, associa-
tion, corporation, and any other organization or group of persons.” Id. Thus, labor unions’
political contributions were capped at $5,000.
7 War Labor Disputes Act, Pub. L. No. 78-89, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167–68 (1943). This statute
did not cover federal primary elections, in which labor unions continued to participate. See,
e.g., United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 579–80 (1957) (discussing a US Senate commit-
tee’s investigation wherein the committee found that a union did not violate “the Corrupt
Practices Act . . . on the ground that [the union] had made direct contributions only to
candidates and political committees involved in . . . federal primaries, to which the Act did
not apply”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 Allison R. Hayward, Revisiting the Fable of Reform, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 421, 454–55
n.201 (2008).
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election than ever on politics, ‘voter education,’ and communications to
members.”9
Four years later, the Taft-Hartley Act expanded restrictions on corporate
and union election conduct by also banning “expenditure[s] in connection with”
federal elections.10 The word “expenditure” proved vague and soon resulted in
litigation. In United States v. CIO, the Supreme Court reviewed a First Amend-
ment challenge to a criminal fine levied under that provision on the CIO and its
president.11 The CIO had published in its weekly newsletter, which was distrib-
uted to union members, a statement urging members to vote for a particular
candidate for Congress.12 It was unclear how the newsletter was funded—
whether from general union dues, or from a subscription fee paid on a volun-
tary basis,13 a fact that went to whether the expenditure “was unfair to individ-
ual union members . . . .”14 Reviewing the relevant legislative history and
interpreting the Act so as to avoid conflict with the First Amendment,15 the
Court focused on the CIO newsletter’s similarity to a traditional newspaper,16
and concluded that “trade or labor union periodicals published regularly for
members, stockholders or purchasers” were not covered by the Taft-Hartley
expenditure ban.17
The Court’s decision reflects arguments that the CIO and other labor orga-
nizations, participating as amici, made in their briefs. For example, in its brief,
the CIO argued that the expenditure ban “invades the right of a free press,
because it bars free access to the political process so vital to the preservation of
a democratic society.”18 The CIO and its amici also argued that participation in
electoral politics was a critical part of unions’ mission because “political activ-
ity is essential in order to preserve the gains achieved through self-organization
and collective bargaining.”19 Further, these gains had to be achieved through
political activity by unions, rather than by individual members acting on their
9 Id. at 454–55.
10 Taft Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947).
11 United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 108 (1948).
12 Id.
13 Id. at 111.
14 Id. at 115. The Court noted that the legislature was also concerned with “the feeling that
corporate officials had no moral right to use corporate funds for contribution to political
parties without the consent of the stockholders.” Id. at 113. However, in Citizens United, the
Court rejected the argument that this was a compelling reason in support of forbidding cor-
porations from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures and electioneering
communications. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010).
15 CIO, 335 U.S. at 116, 120–21.
16 Id. at 122–23.
17 Id. at 122–24.
18 Brief for Appellees at 5, CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (No. 695), 1948 WL 47481, at *5.
19 Id. at 7. See also Brief of International Association of Machinists as Amicus Curiae at 5,
CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (No. 695), 1947 WL 44243, at *5 (“Higher wages won at the bargaining
table would mean little if trade unions could not also urge the passage of socially beneficial
legislation . . . .”); Brief on Behalf of AFL, Amicus Curiae at 4, CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (No.
695), 1948 WL 47483, at *4 (“A union may not realistically bargain with an employer for
higher wages and shorter hours and ignore legislation establishing minimum wages and max-
imum hours.”).
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own,20 because the voices of members of the working class were drowned out
in the political arena:
[T]he national election campaigns of 1940 and 1944 show that powerful individuals
and their families, prominently identified with employer interests, contributed huge
amounts to political campaigns. Unless the members of labor organizations are given
the right collectively to direct their political strength against the strength of these
powerful individuals and family groups, the democratic framework of our entire soci-
ety will be endangered.21
However, the Court did not say whether it was dispositive that the union had
not distributed its newsletter to non-union houses. This distinction soon became
important.
In United States v. UAW, the Court again reviewed an indictment against a
union for its election-related communications.22 The indictment charged that
the union had “used union dues to sponsor commercial television broadcasts
designed to influence the electorate to select certain candidates for Congress in
connection with the 1954 elections.”23 The key difference between this case
and United States v. CIO was that the relevant communications were not lim-
ited to union members;24 thus, the Court held that the communications fell
squarely within the statutory prohibition.25 The UAW then called for the Court
to review the statute’s constitutionality, but the Court instead remanded for the
case to proceed to trial, leaving the First Amendment issues for another day.26
The jury found the union defendants not guilty,27 and the legal issue did not
reach the Supreme Court again for many years.
B. Modern Cases
The next major Supreme Court campaign finance case did not arise for
another two decades. In 1976, the Court decided Buckley v. Valeo,28 “[t]he
fountainhead of modern U.S. campaign finance jurisprudence . . . .”29 Buckley
involved a range of constitutional challenges to the 1971 Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA), including FECA’s limits on both individual contributions to
candidates and candidate expenditures, disclosure requirements, and public
campaign funding eligibility requirements, as well as a challenge to the makeup
of the Federal Election Commission itself.30 This time, however, the main-
stream labor movement did not participate in the litigation, even as amici. The
20 Brief for Appellees, supra note 18, at 9–10 (“The denial of political rights to a labor
organization, such as appellee [CIO], is a denial of political rights to the millions of its
members who have formed and joined appellee in order to achieve political goals which as
individuals would be beyond their accomplishment.”).
21 Id. at 10.
22 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 568, 585 (1957).
23 Id. at 585.
24 Id. at 588–89.
25 Id. at 589.
26 Id. at 591–92.
27 Hayward, supra note 8, at 463.
28 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
29 Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581,
585 (2011).
30 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11.
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only labor-related group that did participate was the Socialist Labor Party,
which unsuccessfully filed a brief challenging the requirement that parties dis-
close the sources of their campaign contributions, as well as the eligibility
requirements for parties to receive public funding.31
The labor movement’s participation in campaign finance litigation after
Buckley was limited to a single case in the 1980s,32 but then the 2000s saw a
surge, with labor unions and federations often seeking to overturn restrictions
on certain types of communications—particularly restrictions on “issue ads,”
which mentioned officeholders by name but did not urge voters to vote for or
against particular candidates. The first of these cases was McConnell v. FEC, in
which the AFL-CIO was one of a diverse list of advocacy groups, political
parties, and politicians who, in a consolidated case, challenged several key
aspects of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).33 These
plaintiffs in the aggregate sought to have the Court strike down a long list of
BCRA’s provisions, such as its ban on the use of “soft money” in federal elec-
tions, its prohibition of campaign contributions from minors, and its prohibition
on party donations to tax-exempt entities, among others.34 However, the AFL-
CIO challenged only three provisions: BCRA’s ban on corporate and union
treasury-funded electioneering communications,35 which would have encom-
passed certain AFL-CIO “issue ads”; the statute’s expansion of the definition of
31 Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Socialist Labor Party in Support of the Appellants Appeal
at 3–4, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (No. 75-436), 1975 WL 171456, at *3–4.
32 That case, FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, concerned a FECA provision per-
mitting unions and certain corporations to solicit donations from “members” for “separate
segregated fund[s]” that could engage in some political advocacy. FEC v. Nat’l Right to
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 198, 200 (1982). Respondent, the National Right to Work
Committee, took a broad view of the definition of the term “member” and, accordingly,
solicited PAC donations from “some 267,000 individuals, who had at one time contributed
to it.” Id. at 200–01. The Court concluded that the First Amendment did not require such a
broad definition of “member.” Id. at 210–11. The AFL-CIO argued for a narrow definition
of “member” so as to preclude “an anomalous grant to non-stock corporations and those
entities alone of a privilege to spend unlimited amounts to solicit political contributions from
individuals who have no legally recognized relationship with the soliciting organization.”
Motion for Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for the AFL-CIO as Amicus
Curiae, Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (No. 81-1506), 1982 WL 608648, at *II.
Evidently, the AFL-CIO sought to avoid a situation in which labor unions would be placed at
a comparative disadvantage vis-a`-vis groups that could fashion looser definitions of mem-
bership. Id. (“[B]ecause unions are true membership organizations, they cannot, in contrast
to respondents, structure their affairs to attempt to take what is beneficial in § 441b without
assuming corresponding obligations to their members.”).
33 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 114 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
34 Id. at 134, 158–59, 174.
35 Brief of the AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees at i, AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168
(2003) (No. 02-1755), 2003 WL 22002431, at *i (presenting AFL-CIO’s questions
presented). BCRA defined “electioneering communication” as “broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” within sixty
days of a general election or thirty days of a primary election. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)
(2012). Except for presidential or vice presidential elections, the communications must also
be “targeted to the relevant electorate.” Id.
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“coordinated” expenditures;36 and the statute’s “advance disclosure” require-
ment.37 The AFL explained that, after the 1994 election of a Republican-con-
trolled Congress, the Federation had run “numerous radio and television ads to
mobilize union households and the general public to oppose the new Republi-
can-controlled Congress’s attempts to enact the ‘Contract With America,’
including major cuts in federal funding for jobs, health and safety, housing,
school lunches and the Medicare and Medicaid programs.”38 In addition, the
AFL-CIO detailed its multi-year practice of periodically running advertise-
ments designed to support or oppose actions taken by the President or Con-
gress, observing that these ads would have fallen under the definition of
“electioneering communications” if they had run too close to a primary or gen-
eral election.39
Although the McConnell Court rejected the AFL’s position on all three
issues,40 the labor movement was not dissuaded from later participation in cam-
paign finance litigation. While no union or labor federation has subsequently
appeared as a party before the Supreme Court in a campaign finance case, the
AFL-CIO has filed amicus briefs in most of the significant campaign finance
cases that have come before the Court since McConnell. In three of these cases,
described below, the AFL-CIO appeared on the side of the party challenging
application of campaign finance law; in a fourth case, the Service Employees
International Union (a union that is affiliated not with the AFL-CIO but,
instead, with the Change to Win federation) filed a brief siding with the govern-
ment; and finally, several unions as well as the AFL-CIO filed briefs in support
of the government in McCutcheon v. FEC, pending before the Court at the time
this Essay was published. In fact, the only major campaign finance case, post-
McConnell, in which there was no union participation was Davis v. FEC,
which concerned BCRA’s “Millionaire’s Amendment,” a provision that raised
the contribution cap for individuals running against certain self-financed
candidates.41
The first of these four cases was Randall v. Sorrell, in which the Court
reviewed the constitutionality of Act 64, a Vermont law that sharply limited
both the amount that donors could contribute to campaigns and the amount that
36 Brief of the AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 35 at *i (presenting AFL-
CIO’s questions presented). The definition of coordinated expenditures is provided at 2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B)–(C) (2012).
37 Brief of the AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 35 at *i (presenting AFL-
CIO’s questions presented). The requirement of advance disclosure required anyone spend-
ing over $10,000 during a calendar year on producing and airing electioneering communica-
tions to identify to the FEC the names of those who contributed and the amount spent on
those communications. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)–(2) (2012). The advance disclosure requirement
applied within twenty-four hours after the spender contracts to spend over $10,000, even if
the communications had not yet aired. Id.
38 Brief of the AFL-CIO Appellants/Cross-Appellees, supra note 35, at 2.
39 Id. at 5–7.
40 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 194, 201–03 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
41 Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 729–30 (2008). The “Millionaire’s Amendment” provided
an exception to BCRA’s contribution caps in cases in which a candidate’s opponent spent
more than $350,000 of his or her own money on campaigning. Id.
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campaigns could spend.42 In addition to limiting contributions and campaign
expenditures, Act 64—much like other campaign finance laws, including
FECA—defined expenditures broadly so that “[a]ny expenditure made on a
candidate’s behalf counts as a contribution to the candidate if it is ‘intentionally
facilitated by, solicited by or approved by’ the candidate.”43 However, Act 64
went further by creating a presumption that party or political committee
expenditures that “ ‘primarily benefit[ ] six or fewer candidates who are associ-
ated with the’ [spender]” would presumptively count against contribution
limits.44
In its brief, the AFL-CIO did not oppose the contribution or expenditure
limits. Instead, it challenged only the presumption that political advertisements
benefitting six or fewer candidates were coordinated with those candidates.45
This coordination presumption “garnered much less attention” than the other
provisions before the Court,46 but the AFL-CIO was focused on it because of
its potential to chill genuine independent expenditures, “lest [speakers] be com-
pelled to account for themselves in court and bear the burden of proving that
they acted independently from one another.”47 However, the Court ultimately
struck down on First Amendment grounds the contribution and expenditure
caps themselves, obviating the need to decide the constitutionality of the
presumption.48
Next, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL II), the Court addressed
an as-applied challenge to BCRA’s ban on corporate and union electioneering
communications.49 Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a non-profit corporation,
42 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 237–38 (2006). As the Court described:
Act 64, which took effect immediately after the 1998 elections, imposes mandatory expenditure
limits on the total amount a candidate for state office can spend during a “two-year general
election cycle,” i.e., the primary plus the general election, in approximately the following
amounts: governor, $300,000; lieutenant governor, $100,000; other statewide offices, $45,000;
state senator, $4,000 (plus an additional $2,500 for each additional seat in the district); state
representative (two-member district), $3,000; and state representative (single member district),
$2,000.
. . . .
Act 64 also imposes strict contribution limits. The amount any single individual can contrib-
ute to the campaign of a candidate for state office during a “two-year general election cycle” is
limited as follows: governor, lieutenant governor, and other statewide offices, $400; state sena-
tor, $300; and state representative, $200.
Id.
43 Id. at 239 (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2809(a), (c) (2002)).
44 Id. (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2809(a), (d) (2002)).
45 Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–3, Randall, 548
U.S. 230 (No. 04-1528), 2005 WL 3464473, at *2–3 (“The ‘related campaign expenditure
rule’ . . . establishes a presumption that an expenditure, by a political party or a political
committee that recruits or endorses candidates, that primarily benefits six or fewer Vermont
state candidates who are associated with that spender, is . . . coordinated with them.”).
46 Id. at 3.
47 Id. at 10.
48 Randall, 548 U.S. at 262–63 (plurality opinion).
49 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 455–56 (2007). This was the
second time this case came before the Court; in 2006, the Court cleared the way for the 2007
case by holding that McConnell did not foreclose an as-applied challenge to BCRA’s elec-
tioneering communications provision. Id. at 456 (citing Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC
(WRTL I), 546 U.S. 410, 412 (2006)). There, the AFL-CIO filed an amicus brief in support
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sought to air a series of commercials that criticized both senators from Wiscon-
sin for filibustering judicial nominations, and asked viewers to “[c]ontact Sena-
tors Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the filibuster.”50 The proposed
ads would have violated BCRA’s prohibition on electioneering communica-
tions if aired within thirty days of an upcoming primary election, in which
Senator Feingold was running unopposed. WRTL brought a declaratory judg-
ment action challenging the constitutionality of BCRA’s electioneering com-
munications ban as applied to its ads.51 It argued that despite mentioning a
candidate by name, its ads nonetheless were not express advocacy—a signifi-
cant distinction, given that the Court had previously held only that “BCRA
survives strict scrutiny to the extent it regulates express advocacy or its func-
tional equivalent.”52 Accordingly, WRTL argued both that BCRA’s prohibition
could not constitutionally be applied to issue ads, and that the Court should
draw a line separating issue ads that mention candidates by name from real
electioneering communications.
Similarly, the AFL-CIO, as amicus in support of WRTL, emphasized that
appeals to officeholders who also happen to be candidates for reelection could
be genuine issue ads, rather than express advocacy or its equivalent.53 It recom-
mended that the Court adopt a six-factor test designed to separate genuine issue
ads from electioneering communications.54 The Court, though, arguably went
further, holding that ads would fall under the definition of “electioneering com-
munication” only if they were “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”55 However,
because the question of how any particular ad could be reasonably interpreted
was a relatively subjective one, more litigation regarding the implementation of
this standard was inevitable. Indeed, the issue returned to the Court in Citizens
United v. FEC.56
C. Citizens United and Beyond
Citizens United began when an advocacy group that accepted a small
amount of corporate funding brought an as-applied challenge to the election-
eering communications provision of BCRA, seeking a refinement of the
of appellant Wisconsin Right to Life. Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellant, WRTL I, 546 U.S. 410 (No. 04-1581), 2005 WL 3076074.
50 WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 458–59.
51 Id. at 460.
52 Id. at 465.
53 Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee at 8, WRTL II, 551 U.S.
449 (Nos. 06-969 & 06-970), 2007 WL 894819, at *8.
54 Id. at 4, 9–10. The six factors were as follows: the identified federal candidate is an
incumbent; the ad discusses a current legislative or executive branch matter; the ad either
calls upon the candidate to take a position or calls upon the public to urge the candidate to
take a position; the ad discusses the candidate’s position only by quoting the candidate or
describing the candidate’s official actions on the matter; the ad does not refer to an election
or candidacy; and the ad does not refer to the candidate’s character or fitness for office. Id. at
10.
55 WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 470. Three of the concurring Justices would have drawn the defini-
tion of electioneering communications even more narrowly. Id. at 497–99 (Scalia, J., joined
by Kennedy & Thomas, J.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
56 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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Court’s holding in WRTL.57 Specifically, Citizens United argued that its docu-
mentary about Hillary Clinton should not qualify as an electioneering commu-
nication if broadcast shortly before an election, either because it was a feature-
length movie rather than a short advertisement, or because the “appeal-to-vote”
test from WRTL II should be expanded or clarified to exclude all communica-
tions that do not include a clear call for vote for or against a candidate.58
The AFL-CIO’s argument went beyond both Citizens United’s position
and its own position in WRTL II: it argued that BCRA’s electioneering commu-
nications provision should be struck down altogether.59 Its concern was the
unpredictability of the “appeal-to-vote” test: “Because the controlling opinion
in WRTL II still leaves the AFL-CIO uncertain as to which of its public speech
is potentially criminal, it has a direct interest in whether McConnell’s facial
upholding of § 203 stands.”60 The AFL-CIO also argued that there was no
“compelling governmental interest in prohibiting union independent expendi-
tures,” as opposed to corporate expenditures, because “federal constitutional
and statutory law fully enable non-members to avoid paying for union political
activities they oppose.”61
Following briefing and oral argument, the Court ordered supplemental
briefing and reargument on the following question: “should the Court overrule
either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce . . . and the part
of McConnell v. [FEC] . . . which addresses the facial validity of § 203 of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 . . . ?”62 Following that directive,
many amici filed supplemental briefs. However, neither the AFL-CIO nor any
other labor organization did so, possibly because the AFL-CIO’s earlier amicus
brief expressly addressed both questions, arguing that the relevant portion of
McConnell should be overruled, but that the Court should preserve Austin.
As is now well-known, the Court again went well beyond the AFL-CIO’s
position and struck down BCRA’s ban on the use of union or corporate general
treasury funds to pay for either electioneering communications or express advo-
cacy that was not coordinated with a campaign.63 Thus, while the AFL-CIO
was vindicated in the sense that it was freed to release general treasury-funded
issue ads at any time without fear of criminal prosecution, the Court also
opened up a vast new avenue for both unions and corporations to engage in
express advocacy of the defeat or election of candidates.
57 Jurisdictional Statement at i, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 2008 WL
3851546, at *i.
58 Id.
59 Brief of the AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant at 3, Citizens United,
558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365216, at *3 (“McConnell should be overruled as to
§ 203’s facial constitutionality.”).
60 Id. at 2.
61 Id. at 3.
62 Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932, 932 (2009) (mem.). In Austin v. Michigan Cham-
ber of Commerce, the Court upheld a Michigan statute that prohibited corporations—but not
unions—from using general treasury funds to make independent expenditures to support or
oppose candidates. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990).
Remarkably, no labor union or federation appeared before the Supreme Court in Austin.
63 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.
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Given that the combined resources of the general treasuries of American
corporations dwarfs those of unions, Citizens United appeared to benefit corpo-
rations much more than labor unions in terms of the ability to get out election-
related messages.64 Thus, it was unsurprising that the Service Employees Inter-
national Union (SEIU)—which had not filed an amicus brief in the case—soon
criticized the decision.65 Perhaps more surprising was that the AFL-CIO has
also called for a constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United,66 sug-
gesting that for it, the value of the desired holding on electioneering communi-
cations was indeed significantly outweighed by the Court’s broader holding on
independent expenditures.
Since Citizens United, the Court has heard argument in two campaign
finance cases: Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Ben-
nett,67 and McCutcheon v. FEC.68 Interestingly, each case involved labor ami-
cus participation that was wholeheartedly in support of the challenged
campaign finance restrictions. First, Arizona Free Enterprise Club concerned
the “matching funds” provision of the Arizona Citizens Clean Election Act.
That provision entitled candidates who accepted public campaign funding to
extra money when their privately financed opponents, together with supportive
independent expenditure groups, spent more than a designated amount.69 The
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) filed an amicus brief in Arizona
Free Enterprise Club. It explained that its support of the provision stemmed
from its “active[ ] participat[ion] in elections at all levels of federal, state, and
local government,” and desire to “participate in fair and transparent electoral
process . . . .”70 It emphasized that although it operated a “substantial indepen-
dent expenditure program,” it nonetheless did not view Arizona’s trigger mech-
anism as a deterrent to its continued engagement in election-related speech in
Arizona.71 And, it emphasized the law’s advantages: “public financing
enhances our members’ and the public’s sense that elections are honest and
fairly conducted.”72 However, the Court was not convinced: it held that the
Arizona law violated the First Amendment rights of privately financed candi-
dates and their supporters who made independent expenditures.73
Finally, in 2013, the Court agreed to hear McCutcheon v. FEC, a case
concerning the constitutionality of federal biannual aggregate limits on contri-
64 I have discussed this point in greater detail in previous work. Garden, supra note 3, at
12–16.
65 Mark McCullough, Testimony: SEIU’s Anna Burger on the Citizens United Decision,
SEIU.ORG (Feb. 2, 2010, 9:55 AM), http://www.seiu.org/2010/02/testimony-seius-anna-bur
ger-on-the-citizens-united-decision.php.
66 Restoring Democracy, AFL-CIO (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.aflcio.org/About/Exec
-Council/EC-Statements/Restoring-Democracy.
67 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
68 McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012), prob. juris. noted, 133 S. Ct.
1242 (2013). Oral arguments occurred on October 8, 2013, a transcript of which is available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-536_7l48.pdf.
69 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2813–14.
70 Brief of Amicus Curiae SEIU in Support of Respondents at 1, Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s
Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (Nos. 10-238 & 10-239), 2011 WL 688729, at *1.
71 Id. at 3–4.
72 Id. at 4.
73 Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2828.
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butions to candidates, political parties, and political action committees.74 In
two briefs, several labor unions and the AFL-CIO all voiced their support for
these provisions. First, the Communications Workers of America and American
Federation of Teachers, alongside a list of non-labor groups, made a detailed
argument about how aggregate limits fight corruption and its appearance.75
Second, and related, the AFL-CIO, National Education Association, SEIU, and
the American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees filed a brief
arguing that the limits presented only a minor encroachment on speech, which
was well-justified by the government’s interest in fighting corruption.76
In sum, labor’s history of union litigation in campaign finance cases
reveals a continuing concern with unions’ rights to talk publicly about politics.
In recent years, the AFL-CIO has taken a carefully calibrated position in cam-
paign finance cases, focusing primarily on preserving its freedom to engage in
issue advocacy and lobbying. However, post Citizens United, the labor move-
ment has begun to side with government in opposing challenges to the constitu-
tionality of campaign finance restrictions. This does not seem to be the result of
any sea change in the labor movement’s attitudes towards such restrictions, but
rather, a reflection of the fact that the most recent cases were unrelated to issue
advocacy.
In the next Part, I discuss briefly the practical results of Citizens United
and other recent developments in campaign finance law, including the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC, which struck down limits on the
amount that individuals could contribute to organizations that made only inde-
pendent expenditures, thereby paving the way for the creation of the “super
PAC.”77
D. Unions in a Post Citizens United World
Although individual unions and labor federations criticized the outcome in
Citizens United, they also appear to have concluded that they cannot afford to
ignore it. Thus, the 2010 and 2012 election cycles saw unions both contribute
to super PACs that were not related to the labor movement, such as Priorities
USA Action,78 and also create their own super PACs.79 While labor-sponsored
74 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012), prob. juris. noted, 133 S.
Ct. 1242 (2013).
75 See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae Communications Workers of America et al. in
Support of Appellee, McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 12-536),
available at http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/mccutcheon_sc_cwa_amici_brief.pdf.
76 See Brief Amici Curiae of the National Education Association et al. in Support of Appel-
lee at 14–15, McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (No. 12-536), available at http://www.bren
nancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/McCutcheon%20National%20Education%20As
sociation_amicus_080713.pdf.
77 SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
78 Andy Kroll, Hollywood and Labor Unions Pony Up for Obama Super-PAC’s Record
Month, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 22, 2012, 7:40 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012
/10/hollywood-unions-obama-super-pac-romney.
79 For example, the National Education Association created the NEA Advocacy Fund,
which spent $4.2 million during the 2010 federal election cycle and just over $1 million
during the 2012 cycle. NEA Advocacy Fund, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets
.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cycle=2012&cmte=C00489815 (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
The Service Employees International Union’s Super PAC spent just over $5.3 million during
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super PACs spent far less than the largest super PACs—the largest conserva-
tive super PAC spent over $142 million and the largest liberal super PAC spent
$65 million—two labor super PACs were nonetheless among the top twenty in
terms of spending. They were the AFL-CIO sponsored Workers’ Voice super
PAC, which spent $6.3 million, and the SEIU super PAC, which spent $5.3
million.80
Interestingly, much of the money raised by the Workers’ Voice super PAC
was devoted to targeted door-to-door canvassing of non-union workers—an
activity that could not be funded from union treasuries before Citizens
United.81 In other words, instead of massive advertising buys, Workers’ Voice
funded millions of conversations about the upcoming election. These efforts
were particularly concentrated in the swing states of Ohio and Wisconsin,
where recent attempts at public sector labor law reform (successful in Wiscon-
sin, but not in Ohio) mobilized union members and supporters.82
III. CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD
This Essay has explored the positions taken by labor unions and federa-
tions—particularly the AFL-CIO—in campaign finance cases before the
Supreme Court. This litigation reveals targeted priorities; in short, unions have
been troubled by some, but far from all, campaign finance regulations. Yet,
there is a potential downside of this targeted approach: outside observers may
focus only on the fact that an amicus brief has been filed in support of one or
more aspects of a challenge to campaign finance law and assume that the labor
movement (or at least the union or federation that filed the brief) supports the
challenge in its entirety. For example, after Citizens United, some commenta-
tors criticized the AFL-CIO for having supported the petitioners, seemingly
assuming that the AFL-CIO’s amicus brief indicated wholesale support for the
outcome in that case.83 This risk is compounded by the fact that labor unions
have only recently begun filing amicus briefs in support of the government in
campaign finance cases, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club and McCutcheon.
This is more than a simple potential image problem for labor; it can also
alter the terms of the debate over who is served by campaign finance restric-
tions. Opponents of campaign finance reform can argue that their cause is non-
partisan by pointing to unions; indeed, although Republican-leaning super
the 2012 federal cycle. 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://
www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&type=S (last visited
Mar. 6, 2014).
80 Id.
81 Molly Ball, Did Citizens United Help Democrats in 2012?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2012, 1:07
PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/12/did-citizens-united-help-demo
crats-in-2012/265800/.
82 Id. See also Ronald Brownstein, The Ohio Twist, NAT’L J., Nov. 3, 2012, at 38, 38–39;
Ronald Brownstein, Obama’s Support in Rust Belt, Sun Belt Very Different, NAT’L J. (Nov.
2, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/thenextamerica/politics/Obama-s-support-in-rust
-belt-sun-belt-very-different-20121102; Monica Davey & Steven Greenhouse, Flood of Con-
servative Money Challenges Ohio Unions’ Voter Drives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2012, at A13.
83 John Nichols, Unions Can’t Compete with Corporate Campaign Cash, NATION (Jan. 24,
2011, 10:44 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/unions-cant-compete-corporate-cam
paign-cash#.
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PACs dramatically outspent their Democratic-leaning counterparts, some
Republicans implied that labor’s support for Democrats resulted in an election
landscape that disadvantaged Republicans.84
Labor’s Supreme Court litigation in the area of campaign finance is
important both for its substantive outcomes and the window that it provides
into union and federation priorities. This is particularly true with respect to the
AFL-CIO, which is the most active litigant in this area. However, the AFL-
CIO’s position had historically been defined largely in terms of campaign
finance regulation that it opposes; it had remained silent (at least before the
Supreme Court) regarding other campaign finance provisions under review.
Thus, the union briefs in Arizona Free Enterprise Club and McCutcheon are
significant because they offer a more complete picture of union views of cam-
paign finance law. With new campaign finance cases percolating up to the
Court in the wake of Citizens United, unions will undoubtedly have continued
opportunities to make their priorities in this area clear to the Court, as well as
the American public.
84 Davey & Greenhouse, supra note 82.
